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‘Russian merchant’ legacies in post-Soviet trade with China:




This article focuses on Russian traders operating in China,
particularly in Yiwu, the major commercial hub for the ‘small
commodity’ trade, and explores the idea of the ‘Russian merchant’
prevalent in Russia today. Rather than examining the new
commercial culture from the perspective of global neoliberalism, it
deals with Russia’s pre-Soviet merchant estate (soslovie) and its
present-day political-ideological evocations. While there is no
direct cultural-professional continuity between pre-Soviet and
post-Soviet merchants, some similarities have come to the fore
and have been encouraged by the state and the Church. This is
due to the promotion of a particular moral economy wherein the
‘Russian merchant’ ﬁgures as a positive category. Using a case
study of a Russian trader in Yiwu, the article illustrates the new
ways in which mistrust as well as ‘traditional’ merchant attributes
such as patriotism and patriarchal authority, have been harnessed






During the ﬁnal years of the Soviet state, a mass of ordinary and not-so-ordinary citizens
from diﬀerent professional and social backgrounds entered the novel sphere of entrepre-
neurship. Since popular Soviet understandings that the market principle ‘buy cheap, sell
dear’ designated immoral illegal ‘speculation’ (spekuliatsia) held sway (see Humphrey
2002a; Ries 2002), the ﬁgures of late Soviet and early post-Soviet market traders gave
rise to contrasting new images of commercial activities. On the one hand, trade (torgovlia)
was associated with sheer necessity and the ‘fall from grace’ of those involved in it. The
new commercial actors-cum-‘victims-of-market-reforms’ included former teachers,
clerks, engineers, and workers who were trading on the market or had street stalls or
became suitcase/shuttle traders (chelnoki), regularly crossing national borders. An ultimate
urban icon of victimisation was the impoverished pensioner-trader – ‘the grandma’
(babushka, although men also participated) – reselling things bought or found elsewhere
next to bus stops and metro stations. On the other hand, trade stood for the (illegitimate)
wealth and success of the new heterogeneous stratum of businessmen and entrepreneurs
(from kooperatory and kommersanty to biznesmeny and fermery). Privatised industrial
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enterprises and new private farmers turned to trade as their main economic activity. This
development invited analogies with (‘pre-modern’) mercantile capitalism (see e.g.,
Burawoy and Krotov 1993). Many of those who could successfully navigate in this new
ﬁeld of commerce were nomenklatura (i.e., former Party/Komsomol administrators and
activists, the Soviet managerial class) and black-market operators – the representatives
of the last Soviet generation who acquired particular entrepreneurial and organisational
skills under the ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ of state socialism (see e.g., Yurchak
2002). These individuals thus became the ‘mediators between the two eras’ (Lipovetsky
2003, 70): late socialism (or Soviet ‘stagnation’) and late capitalism Russian-style where
economic survival (let alone ﬂourishing) and ethical life were seen as being incompatible.
The diﬀerent popular associations attached to commercial activities, which still linger on
in Russian society, also indicate that participation in trade has been experienced as humi-
liation and professional denigration by some and as promising and exciting opportunities
by others.1 Besides documenting the crisis of values and popular scorn of capitalist traders
and business people, anthropologists and other scholars have oﬀered insightful analyses
of the complex ways in which post-Soviet business and discursive practices have taken
shape and have shaped new entrepreneurial actors. While post-Soviet practices have
been shown to owe a great deal to Soviet ‘hybrid logic’ of the oﬃcial and personalised
public spheres, unwritten rules of networking and hierarchies of belonging (e.g., Radaev
2002; Yurchak 2002; Ledeneva 2009),2 new discursive constructs of being an ‘entrepreneur
of oneself’ have, by contrast, been linked to global neo-liberalism and its models of suc-
cessful living (e.g., Yurchak 2003; Hemment 2015, esp. p. 175). In this way, these
approaches situate the heterogeneous category of the post-Soviet trader or new
Russian entrepreneur at the intersection of Soviet legacies and global neoliberal capitalism.
Following in these tracks, this article engageswith newpractices and ethical orientations
of the post-Soviet transnational trader, but it also does so with the help of the moral
economy approach. The ethnographic object is the small-scale, individual Russian entre-
preneurs supplying Russia, but sometimes also other destinations, with cheap Chinese
commodities. From the early 1990s onwards, commercial routes linking Russia and China
and beyond have been developed by actors whomwe tend to associate with ‘globalization
from below’, and, as Matthews, Lins Ribeiro, and Alba Vega (2012, 11) noted, who are often
‘out-neoliberalizing’ global corporations by trying to operate below the radar of state regu-
lations. In particular, the article considers the success story of a former petty trader from a
Russian industrial city in the Urals who hasmade his fortune in Yiwu, China, highlighting the
ﬂuid and porous boundaries between ‘globalisation from below’ and ‘globalisation from
above’. It is in this context that the perspective of moral economy is pertinent because it
allows us to bring under the same analytical framework diﬀerent but entangled regimes
of value (cf. Palomera and Vetta 2016): those driven by the state, those inspired by ‘oppor-
tunistic’ neoliberalism and those embedded in particular cultural dispositions. As anthro-
pologists have recently argued, moral economy should be understood as an inherently
syncretic perspective, i.e., combining diﬀerent logics, (e.g., de Sardan 1999), that is not
restricted to a speciﬁc class or group of people (e.g., ‘the peasants’, ‘the petty trader’),
but instead accounts for ‘broad social ﬁelds of thought and action’ in which the actor in
question is inscribed (Palomera and Vetta 2016, 415).
Where neoliberalism is commonly portrayed (and experienced) as a disorganisation of
non-market regimes of value and the social relations that underlie them, new moral
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registers emerge to contain and harmonise ‘disorder’ and these do not necessarily replicate
the discursive templates of neoliberalism’s own ‘ideological charter’ (Greenhouse 2012, 5–
7). It has widely been observed that neoliberalism has a tendency to create a tense ambiva-
lent coalition with traditional conservatism, especially of nationalistic or xenophobic kinds
(e.g., Crouch, della Porta, and Streeck 2016). Both Russia and China, for instance, provide
good examples of how conservative approaches to ancient traditions have recently been
coupled with economic-social realities brought about by neoliberal globalisation. In
China, (neo-)Confucianism has been used to justify the introduction of a capitalist
economy and the ideological hegemony of wealth in what is formally a communist one-
party state. The ‘Confucian strategy’ in general and ‘Confucian merchants’ in particular
aim simultaneously at legitimising political authority and challenging Eurocentric dis-
courses of development and enrichment (Zurndorfer 2017). In a similar vein, Russian ‘tra-
ditional values’ have been introduced into collective memory in the post-Soviet decades
to address perceived shortages of new positive unifying national symbols. President
Putin has complained that there is a ‘deﬁcit of spiritual values’ and that these values have
to be recovered from the thousands of years of Russian history.3 Within this paradigm of
‘national recovery’ and renewal, the pre-revolutionary ‘Russian merchant’ or the merchant
estate (kupecheskoe soslovie)4 with its culture, religiosity and political orientation has
emerged as yet another ‘site of memory’; Russian merchants have been transformed into
national heroes of sorts, becoming a model for present-day Russian entrepreneurs and
helping to establish a Russian cultural capitalist antipode toWestern neoliberal subjectivity.
While conservative (neo)traditionalism has come to deﬁne the discursive contours of
the moral economy in Russia, there is a conspicuous absence of references to ‘the
Russian merchant’ in ethnographies of post-Socialist economic development and trade.
This is, of course, not that surprising given that there is no apparent continuity. There is
neither any legal continuity of the merchant estate, nor any obvious ‘organic’ cultural or
kinship links between pre-Soviet merchants and post-Soviet businessmen and traders.5
Many prominent Russian merchant families, including those few whose legacy was pre-
served during the Soviet period, moved abroad, while others vanished in Soviet purges
or became ordinary employees of the Soviet state.6 With the exception of ethnic
trading minorities and migrants (for instance, Roma, or traders from Central Asia and
the Caucasus operating in the predominantly Slav regions of the USSR) who maintained
traces of their commercial cultures or lifestyles at the margins of the socialist economy,
new Russian traders had little in terms of historical business culture, values or commercial
traditions to rely upon. For many post-Soviet traders, market places and the transnational
shuttle trade have become the ﬁrst ‘school of entrepreneurship’ (Diatlov 2015, 30).
To sum up, from a moral economic perspective, merchant values and ideology as they
are represented historically and discussed today in public discourse (mass media, Russian
NGOs, the Orthodox Church, state institutions) have to be acknowledged alongside the
above-mentioned model of the neoliberals (e.g., in the business mass media and
‘success manuals’), ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ and legacies of informal Soviet net-
working. In line with the Russian state’s increasing emphasis on economic nationalism and
anti-Western hostility (due to falling oil prices and Western economic sanctions imposed
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea), political and religious authorities, as well as civil
society, are participating in the on-going ‘framing’ (Mitchell 1990) of moral economy.
Even though the neoliberal actors of ‘globalisation from below’ (as well as those of
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‘globalisation from above’) do not uniformly subscribe to authoritarian traditionalism, its
impact on many Russian entrepreneurs’ economic practices and forms of self-identiﬁ-
cation/-presentation should not be overlooked or underestimated. My example of success-
ful Russian operations that have taken oﬀ in Yiwu and given rise to a major wholesale
business in Russia is also meant to illustrate how a moral economy ‘travels’ along the
routes established by ‘globalisation from below’.
In what follows I will ﬁrst introduce Russian small-commodities traders in Yiwu, fore-
grounding forms of cooperation and the place of mistrust in the transnational traders’
moral economy. Then I turn to the articulations of moral economy in interconnected
spaces: a case study of ‘Russian merchant innovation’ in China – a Russian trading
company organised as a micro-enclave – and its headquarters in Russia. Finally, I shall con-
textualise these transnational traders in the broader discursive value regime of ‘the Russian
merchant’, showing how some Russian entrepreneurs inscribe themselves into a histori-
cally disrupted and recently created cultural genealogy of the merchant estate.
Background: an ethnography of Russian ‘economic behaviour’ and trust in
Yiwu
The city of Yiwu – the world’s supermarket or ‘one-stop shop’ – oﬀers the largest number
of small and low-grade commodities of any place in China. It has been a popular destina-
tion for diﬀerent types of Russian traders, from small shop owners and middlemen to big
wholesalers,7 for almost two decades. As Yiwu’s indoor Futian market was rapidly expand-
ing in the 1990s–2000s, it attracted shuttle traders who had previously visited Urumqi and
Beijing’s Russian markets. Along with these ﬂows of Russians, Russophone Chinese and
Central Asians from the former Soviet republics have also come to the city to work as
agents, middlemen and interpreters. What has attracted traders to small and ‘remote’
Yiwu – a city still often described in Russian online reviews as a place ‘away from civiliza-
tion’ (e.g., Bondarenko 2015) or a ‘village of speedy self-development’8 – is cheap prices,
the availability of small wholesale, quick manufacturing schedules and the concentration
of a vast range of goods in one market-place.
In 2002 Russia was the second largest importer of Yiwu goods after the UAE. It fell to
ﬁfth place in 2009 (Pliez 2012, 27–29). More recently, the number of Russian traders has
fallen further still and this is attributed to the weak rouble and overall economic recession
caused by lower oil prices. Yet, while at the time of my research visit in summer 2016, there
were not many Russians roaming the market, their commercial signiﬁcance could be seen
in numerous cargo and transport companies serving Russian destinations, the Russian-
language ads of Chinese manufacturers and exclusive ‘Russian’ commodities (e.g.,
Russian icons and souvenirs, Russian ‘Father Christmas’ and other toys that are often
copied by Chinese manufacturers during the trade fairs in Moscow or Hong-Kong). Predic-
tions voiced in the early 1990s that the ‘sharks of capitalism’ would squeeze out small
traders from the lucrative trade with China (e.g., Ukhlin 1993) have not come true.
Instead, the new hubs popular with agents of ‘globalisation from below’ have continued
to produce new ‘sharks’ in their own right. And the possibility of a small-volume wholesale,
including transport services to deal with small consignments, has kept on attracting new
small traders.
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Similar to other commercial destinations worldwide (cf. Yukseker 2004 on Turkey),
Russian traders in Yiwu do not constitute a trading diaspora or extensive business net-
works of co-ethnics. Single traders or small groupings come to the city for several days
to make a selection of goods and place orders at the Futian market. They visit showrooms
of their old suppliers and roam the market in search of new ideas, new types of merchan-
dise and better prices. When placing an order, the trader can only hope that his supplier
will deliver the agreed upon quality and quantity, because, with the exception of old stock,
at the time of purchase there are only samples available for inspection.
The dynamics of Russian trade and sociality in Yiwu do not appear to be diﬀerent from
other commercial hubs in China (see e.g., Humphrey 2018). At present, there is a general
perception that China is relatively ‘maﬁa-free’ and safe for doing business: criminals target-
ing transnational traders are kept in check by the authorities and the same authorities may
turn a blind eye to traders’ violation of the visa regime (cf. Lan 2017 on Guangzhou). A
Tadjik market trader in St. Petersburg told me fondly that when in China she could
leave money in a hotel room and nobody would steal it: ‘If a cleaner steals your money,
the authorities will chop oﬀ her ﬁnger. So they do not steal from foreigners in China.’ In
Yiwu, a young Russophone Uzbek interpreter in his early 20s recalled that shortly after
he came to China to study he set up a business operation to extract ‘protection’ money
(a ‘roof’, krysha) disguised as ‘cleaning fees’ from Chinese street vendors and Arab café
owners operating next to his college. Everybody paid him, but when his Chinese friends
understood what he was doing they warned him that the Chinese authorities would
simply execute him if they found out. These narratives of ‘safe China’ contrast sharply
with Russians’ views of Chinese businesses and traders in Russia and the border zones
as being controlled by Chinese intelligence and/or maﬁa-style conglomerates. These
views were commonplace in the 1990s (e.g., Lukin 1998); perhaps attempts by the local
Chinese authorities to safeguard an agreeable business environment have contributed
to the shift in traders’ perceptions. In Yiwu, for instance, the authorities introduced a
city-wide video surveillance system in 2003 and a local people’s police and, in tandem
with new security measures, have promoted the city as a ‘second home area’ where
foreigners are treated as citizens and encouraged to enjoy a ‘natural bond’ with the
locals as if they were all one big ‘family’ (Pieke 2012, 62–63).
Yet, the vision of ‘safe China’ does not imply that traders operate in a high trust environ-
ment. Theorisations of ‘globalisation from below’ often highlight ‘human social bonds’
(Matthews, Lins Ribeiro, and Alba Vega 2012, 11) or trust as a necessary idiom to carry
on transactions where there are not many legal options available to enforce an agree-
ment/contract (cf. Yukseker 2004, 54–56). Russian practitioners in China would, by con-
trast, emphasise cultural alienation and mistrust as a local disposition and a quality of
commercial ethics. Writing about cross-border trade in the Chinese town of Manzhouli,
Peshkov (2018) documents a pervasive suspicion on the part of Russians of their
Chinese ‘helpers’ (‘pomogai’), ‘friends’ and commercial partners. He identiﬁes an ‘insolva-
ble contradiction’ that suspicion produces – Russians attempt to resolve problems through
their Chinese ‘friends’ but at the same time they are looking for ‘real’ Chinese prices that
these friends might be hiding from them.
As if in elaboration of this theme, my Russian interlocutors in Yiwu postulated that the
Chinese were not capable of being friends with foreigners (laowai, Chinese).9 It would be a
simpliﬁcation to view this attitude as mere pragmatic caution (a ‘survival strategy’) under
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conditions of market competition. For Russians, the normative idea of friendship means a
selﬂess emotional relationship of trust andChinese are not seen as sharing this cultural under-
standing. For the latter, friendship is said to be a façade that disguises calculations of beneﬁts.
If trust designates relationships in which people regularly place valued outcomes at risk of
others’ mistakes or failures (cf. Tilly 2005), in their ‘friendships’ with Chinese, Russians try to
avoid taking such risks. Even Russians’ expectations of Chinese pragmatism are often under-
minedby suppliers’preference for short-termcalculationsof gain (e.g., goods are not properly
packed, are faulty or the wrong commodities are shipped) that makes them appear uninter-
ested in long-term cooperation. Online reviews of Yiwu remind traders that every deal should
be treated as the ﬁrst deal and approached with due caution and checks (e.g., Bondarenko
2015). In this respect, Yiwu trade resembles e-commerce on platforms like Alibaba that has
been open to Russia since 2015 – there is a (perceived) high risk of being cheated by
Chinese suppliers one way or the other; it is the regular physical presence of traders and
their local agents administering control of shipments that is meant to make Yiwu trade less
risky than buying similar commodities on Alibaba.
In this commercial environment, traders’ ‘hope’ for successful dealings is thus often
vested in their local agents and Russian interpreters. Most traders do not speak Chinese
and use interpreters who either work for a cargo/transport company or function as inde-
pendent agents providing quality control of the goods at the factories and organising
deliveries to Russia. The independent interpreters-agents work on commission from the
total value of purchased commodities paid by their Russian clients. Often these individuals
operate in several commercial hubs in China and have an established circle of more or less
regular Russian customers that they have cultivated for years. Russians’ socialisation with
the local Chinese is minimal and the value of trust in one’s interpreter-agent is reﬂected in
the higher rates of ‘commission’ that they receive.10
Scholars relate mistrust of Chinese to Russians’ ambiguous valuation of China. There is a
willingness to see Chinese as allies, friendly neighbours and commercial partners but there
are also concerns about China’s economic might and geographic expansion. This disposi-
tion, they argue, is nurtured by the Russian state’s preoccupation with security rather than
economic development (Shlapentokh 2007; Peshkov 2018). Indeed, my Chinese interlocu-
tors in Yiwu have hinted at traders’ ‘wounded patriotism’: Russians are fascinated by
Chinese economic growth, but it also hurts their national pride that they have been over-
taken by what was, until recently, ‘a less developed’ and poorer nation. The legacy of the
latter image may also explain why, in contrast to other transnational traders (e.g Afghanis,
Arabs) Russians in Yiwu are reluctant to establish intimate or matrimonial relations with
the host population.11 (Several popular night clubs are staﬀed with Russian and Ukrainian
dancers who double as potential dates for local migrants from the former Soviet space.)
This image may also explain traders’ attempts at ignoring ‘the end of cheap China’:
pushing prices below what seems reasonable to local suppliers is justiﬁed by the assump-
tion that there are Chinese who are still prepared to work ‘for a bowl of soup’.12
The traps of innovation and potentialities of success
If the correlation of price and quality is a major headache for small traders (for they typi-
cally receive the quality they have paid, not ‘hoped’, for), another economic dilemma,
which is not relevant only for Russian traders, is related to ‘exclusivity’ and the ‘copying’
HISTORY AND ANTHROPOLOGY S53
of cheap commodities by competitors. The fear of ‘theft’ and the secretive search for
‘exclusive’ goods, which can be traced back to the early years of the shuttle trade (see
Ukhlin 1993), structure commercial and personal relations between traders, their
Chinese suppliers and interpreters. An owner of a small supermarket chain, and a ﬁrst-
time visitor to Yiwu I met in 2016 identiﬁed the problem immediately:
Now I got this idea… I can copy Gdzhel patterns and print them on the bedding sets – they
will sell like hot buns at my supermarket. But as soon as I place an order at the Futian, every-
body will know and copy my idea. Gdzhel bedding will be everywhere.
Another of my interlocutors who was based in Yiwu and regularly sent goods back home
with his wife shared with me his solution to the problem:
I designed myself this beautiful Christmas tree, I knew it would sell well. I came to my old sup-
plier and told him that he produces this tree for me, I pay him, and so that we are clear – I give
him my design as a gift. There is one condition – he cannot sell a single copy of this tree to
anybody from my country. If he does and I ﬁnd out, I will kill him. I was clear about that.
Chinese interpreters-agents are under pressure to manifest high moral grounds and
perform ‘loyalty’ to their clients, which, among other things, implies refusing Russian cus-
tomers dealing in similar commodities if they come from the same city (even a megapolis
like Moscow), and reporting subversive behaviour of traders’ employees or associates.
Traders-compatriots are particularly suspect as potential ‘thieves’ of one’s brilliant idea
of a new commodity, and those buying similar types of goods avoid each other socially
in the city. This excessive concern with the ‘uniqueness’ of cheap commodities is some-
thing that differentiates Russian traders from some other groups or ethnic networks
who also operate in Russia.
A striving towards ‘exclusive innovation’ seems to impact both on Russians’ individual
commercial growth and their collective share of the Russian market. As one Russian old-
timer in Yiwu put it:
Russians… do not understand how this trade works. They can only supply a supermarket or
keep a stall (lavka, Russian), but there are no really big wholesalers, like our Pashtuns… They
(Pashtuns) manage to keep prices in Moscow lower than in Yiwu!
Whereas Russian traders make full use of the ﬂexibility provided by transport companies
that take consignments of any (small) size, Afghanis load full containers with identical
goods belonging to different traders and send these container-‘caravans’ to Russia.
Taking advantage of economies of scale and cheaper transport costs, rather than
betting on the ‘exclusivity’ of cheap goods that are difﬁcult to ensure, the trading dia-
sporas secure their success in Russia.
However, innovative schemes of business organisation have also emerged in response
to this market competition and a culture of secrecy; Russian traders’mistrust of co-ethnics,
which precludes eﬀective cooperation and networks, has sometimes encouraged new
economic-social forms, exhibiting ideological traces attributed to the merchant estate.
А Russian wholesale company based in Yiwu that I call ‘the Corporation’, which has
grown out of the eﬀorts of a small trader, illustrates how mistrust is harnessed to
achieve economic success and how together with the patriotic-traditionalist discourse it
forges a model of Russian moral economy.
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The Russian islands in Yiwu
The community of Russian migrants in Yiwu is small and spatially dispersed.13 One site of
commercial and social gravitation is a complex of several streets across the road from the
Futian market that host transport companies, Russian, Georgian, Azeri and Central Asian
restaurants, clubs and a hotel, catering for Russophone visitors. A Russian migrant I call
Nikolai, who has spent more than a decade in Yiwu, referred to this area as ‘the Russian
island’ (Russkii ostrov). It was also Nikolai who told me about a diﬀerent ‘Russian island’
located on the outskirts of Yiwu and created by a shuttle trader – the Corporation.
The company’s ‘origin-story’ dates back to the early 2000s when a trader from an indus-
trial city in the Urals, who had tried his luck with diﬀerent small ventures in Russia (e.g., a
shoe repair workshop), used his starter capital of 2000 US $ to import Chinese-made toys
and souvenirs from Yiwu. By 2016, having survived the ﬁnancial crisis of the late 2000s and
the fall of the rouble in 2014, the company claimed to have suppliers from 50 countries,
more than 5000 employees and was selling the larger part of its product range under
its own brand name.14 Around 100 Russian employees, from sales managers and
lawyers to workers, are based in Yiwu and today, the Corporation is the biggest Russian
company in the city, formally operating under the name of its Chinese General Partner
(general’nyi partner) that is headed by the Russian owner’s old Chinese friend (drug,
Russian). The Chinese friend is in charge of all transport operations and also represents
the Corporation’s merchandise at the Futian market.
The growth of the company went hand in hand with its transformation into a kind of
enclave with speciﬁc social, psychological and labour technologies, fenced oﬀ from
local society. The employees are mainly hired in Russia, by the Russian head oﬃce, and
moved to China on temporary contracts, and they are not allowed to talk to other Russians
in Yiwu. In the Futian market, Russians are not allowed into the company’s showroom (Rus-
sophone traders have to show their passports to prove that they come from elsewhere); all
wholesale deliveries to Russia are dealt with by the head oﬃce in Russia.
Diﬀerent arrangements are in place to fence oﬀ risks posed by business competitors
and ‘thieves’ of innovative designs, as well as to produce a particular vision of moral
economy. Since a couple of years ago, the company’s oﬃces, a large showroom, the dor-
mitories of Russian employees, a canteen serving Russian food for free, sports facilities, and
warehouses, have all been gathered ‘under one roof’ and kept under total surveillance. To
access the territory, employees use their ﬁngerprints and all guests have to be cleared by
management. Foreigners-dates are not welcome: ‘We should not have outsiders in our
home, how do you know that he is not a terrorist?’ Unauthorised contacts between ordin-
ary employees and outsiders may lead to punishment, including bullying and corporal
chastisement. Chinese employees of the company have a separate dormitory outside
the ‘Russian compound’. A shuttle bus moves some workers to and from the Futian
market, whereas those who do not work on the market spend their days in the compound.
Working hours are not ﬁxed: after a quick supper in the canteen (a huge screen with music
videos does not encourage a slow meal) around 6pm, people go back to the oﬃce to work
‘as long as they want.’ Sunday is the day oﬀ; some employees go out to town for a meal or
to visit a beauty salon, but many old-timers opt for a sleep-in.
The work rhythm, surveillance and spatial segregation may appear oppressive to an
outsider, but listening to the insiders it became clear that many accepted the arrangement
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whereby the economic, the social and the intimate or sexual were fused within one place
and one institution. One young unmarried female sales manager imagined the company’s
showroom at the Futian as her small palace (dvorets) where she could invest her ‘energy
and soul’ (energiiu i dushu) into her clients. Another woman talked about how the Corpor-
ation allows her to have a good quality life:
In Russia I would spend all my money on rent, food, transport… It is an illusion that in Russia
you can work until 7 pm and be free. You’d spend so much time in traﬃc, shopping, cooking,
cleaning. Here there are people who do this work and I use my time to make money for the
company… I would not have more leisure time elsewhere… I work and then I come to my
room to wash and sleep… I do not diﬀerentiate between work and nonwork…we work hard
and relax well.
Making money for the company was mentioned as a supreme value, leading some
employees to develop a close afﬁnity with their customers:
I treat my clients’ business as mine. I have helped one to choose commodities, now his
business is 80% our merchandise.… I am concerned (perezhivaiu) about my clients, they
share their lives with me, their ambitions, and I get to know their children, wives and their
aspirations.
My interlocutors mentioned that there are employees who long for ‘freedom’ (volia) or
have ‘lost the plot’ and been sent back to Russia; the pressures of collective living and hard
work are acknowledged by the company: those who have endured more than three years
in Yiwu are rewarded by a star in the compound’s ‘walk of fame’. Yet, they saw the secluded
‘Russian island’ of work-rest-sex provided by the Corporation as safe and self-suﬃcient.
Various leisure activities are organised by the dedicated employees and the company
encourages sexual romantic relations only within its walls. The availability of mating partners
is regulated by themanagement. ‘In our company,… the boys and girls are friends. Hopefully
I will meetmyhusbandhere aswell,’ the salesmanager toldme. One’s place in the company’s
hierarchy determines the acceptable degree of personal and sexual freedom in interactions
with outsiders. ‘Unsanctioned’ attempts to mess up the top-down allocations of ‘partners’,
just as undesirable contacts with Russophone outsiders, can be punished by co-workers. In
addition to video surveillance, mutual horizontal surveillance and denunciation, not unlike
in the Soviet collective (e.g Kharkhordin 1999), are ﬁrmly in place.
In this way, besides being a work collective, the Corporation in Yiwu functions as a hier-
archically-organised, paternalistic ‘home’ (dom), representing a moral economy that brings
to mind a Russian-style Phalanstery. To recall, the Phalanstery was conceived by the nine-
teenth century French radical philosopher, Charles Fourier, as a utopian community that
would host a group of people (500–1000) working together as one extended family, sus-
taining an autonomous economy and integrating social, economic and private life in an
architectural complex segregated from wider society. When the Phalanstery idea was dis-
cussed in nineteenth century Russia, the ‘impossible equality’ proposed by Fourier was
rejected. Instead, harmony was to be safeguarded by a social structure based on ‘inequal-
ity of condition and class as well as a hierarchy of capabilities and merit’. For its critics, the
Russian-style Phalanstery was as autocratic as the Russian monarchy (Kaplan 1958, 169–
171). In the Corporation, the higher authority is vested into the trader-founder. When I
asked my hosts whether they knew what model of business organisation he relied
upon, they replied that this was ‘a model of a strong man who creates something out
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of nothing, who makes everyone very proud’ and whom they respected ‘endlessly’ (besko-
nechno). They went on to describe the founder as a genius, who had an individual
approach to each and every one of his employees and who created conditions for each
person ‘to stay in Yiwu as long as possible to make money for the company’.
The imaginary of a secure ‘home’ fostered by the Corporation locates it oﬀ-the national
grid.15 While for some employees this autonomy is mainly about segregation from sur-
rounding China, for others, being ‘oﬀ the national grid’ also implies distancing from
Russia as a ‘homeland’. As one woman put it:
Everything about this place [Yiwu] irritates me, the food, the way of life,… but I no longer say
that I go home when I go to Russia. I say that I go to Russia to see mymother. After two years in
Yiwu, I do not live in China…We are a Russian island inside greater China. I like this company –
this is my home.
What also makes the Corporation-cum-home similar to the historical Russian take on the
Phalanstery is it embeddedness in a Russian political language that is at present domi-
nated by state patriotism and Orthodox identity.
Not only is a substantial part of the Corporation’s China-made merchandise Russian
patriotic commodities (from car stickers with anti-Western motifs to Putin t-shirts) and
Orthodox paraphernalia. Both inside and outside, the compound is decorated with
symbols of national-political belonging. There is a huge drawing of the Kremlin on one
wall of the oﬃce building, and a ‘patriotic corner’ with a Russian ﬂag and a portrait of
Putin in the drawing room. Patriotic posters, featuring the Russian bear, Stalin and the
like, hang on the walls in common areas. The display of photographs includes a picture
of the founder with the singer Grigori Leps, who was invited to perform at a corporate
event. And Leps is not just any Russian pop star – he is a pro-regime artist who participated
in Putin’s election campaign in 2012, and has been blacklisted by the US for moving ‘black
cash’ abroad and having connections to maﬁa-circles. All in all, the Yiwu compound boasts
a type of patriotism that is based on an alliance with and proximity to political power in
Russia.
Although at the ﬁrst sight, these patriotic displays may appear to be routine expressions
of ‘national belonging’ in a diaspora, it does not take long to ﬁnd out that the Yiwu com-
pound and the Corporation’s head oﬃce in Russia belong to a continuous ideological
space established by the founder, who moves between China and Russia, and maintained
by his Russian employees, some of whom also move between the oﬃces in Yiwu and
Russia. This ideological space, in turn, provides a glimpse into the ways in which moral
economy logics are applied in Russia and linked to reformulations of neoliberal subjectivity
in Russia more generally.
Patriotism and a ‘Little North Korea’
Corporate practices at the company’s Russian headquarters illuminate values that have
been persistently promoted in Putin’s Russia. Some of the values are documented in
the company’s online promotional materials, such as new rituals of the Great Patriotic
War’s celebrations, including a collective Victory waltz, everyday singing of the Russian
Anthem, a competition for ‘the most patriotically decorated’ workplace, consecration of
the workplaces by the region’s highest Orthodox authorities followed by a speech
about the ‘joy’ (radost’) to be brought to one’s workplace, and so on. In October 2016,
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the founder formulated his ethics and vision in a rare public appearance in connection
with his winning the title of ‘the Person of the Year’ (Chelovek Goda), to which he was
nominated by the editorial board of the on-line business portal ‘Business Quarterly’
(Delovoi Kvartal) in his home city.
… the person of the year has to talk about optimistic things… Today we are a very rich
company, and I am also a very rich man… How could I achieve this? – I can simply see
what others cannot see. This is the ﬁrst point. Second, I have built my business on very
diﬀerent premises… The basis is…what is needed most, ﬁrst it is morality (nravstvennost’)
and second, patriotism. The third is love of what you are doing. Probably, this love should
be number one. I even invented a slogan: ‘The one who loves his business/occupation
(delo) transforms it into art.’ …
If a person loves his business, maybe he is not going to be rich, but he will have a decent life. A
reason for non-success (neuspekh) is not loving your occupation, but loving the money…
Yes… I have decorated the new oﬃce in the style of the Hermitage (museum).16 The
ceilings are decorated in gold, thousands of meters of ceilings. My comrade, a Duma
deputy, came to visit. He rolled his eyes like this… But I am not ashamed because I am
doing it for the people. The oﬃce is 15,000 square metres, there are around 2000
people there and I will add another 15,000 metres. This is going to be the biggest
oﬃce in the whole world.
The entrepreneur did not make the impression of being a skilful public speaker, but his
short speech was very well received by the audience – representatives of the local
business community – who cheered and applauded throughout his address. The
speech and the Corporation’s promotional materials encapsulate parameters of a particu-
lar type of new Russian entrepreneurs, as I will discuss below.
The scope of patriotic activities of the Corporation has not passed unnoticed outside
business circles. A Russian regional online news-site in their regular rubric ‘Selected
rumours about the best people of Russia. Don’t be afraid of rumours, the truth is
scarier’, published an article about the Corporation entitled ‘The patriotic boom
swept the Ural businessmen up.’17 Public discussions of the company’s ethics are,
however, largely reserved to online ‘ﬂame-wars’ between its former and current
employees and job seekers. Negative evaluations emerge in blogs and online reviews
by disgruntled former employees who, besides dissatisfaction with long working
hours (ironically called ‘Chinese hours’), grey salaries, and a system of ‘collective’
ﬁnes,18 mention that the founder considers non-Orthodox believers to be immoral
persons, and that people are asked to publicly manifest support for power (on one
occasion, employees were told to use the company’s stickers ‘I am for Putin’ on their
private cars)19; the failure to participate in the patriotic rituals is punished by ﬁnes.
One former employee compared the company to ‘a little North Korea.’20
Defenders of the Corporation and the company’s trolls respond by attacking these
‘opportunists’:
… patriotism and love for the Motherland is one of the speciﬁcities of the company, and it is
particularly important because the collective is young. In contrast to many competitors-self-
seekers /rvachi/ who only see golden dollars with their greedy eyes, and who think only
about proﬁts,…who have neither soul nor the pride of the real patriots… /the Corporation/
makes the world around us better!!!21
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This response to the Corporation’s critics summarises current rhetoric in Russia differen-
tiating ‘bad’ and ‘good’ economic behaviour in explicitly patriotic terms that manifest
support for the current power holders. It exempliﬁes attempts aimed at the popularisation
of a politically loyal moral economy. It also highlights an ideological opposition of the
‘(neo)liberal’ entrepreneurs (liberaly) as potentially subversive subjects22 and the (neo)tra-
ditionalist traders perpetuating the ethical world of ‘the Russian merchant’ made relevant
to Russia’s twenty-ﬁrst century capitalism.
A post-Soviet moral economy and value hierarchy: revival of the merchant
estate
The secretive ‘Russian-style Phalanstery’ that the Corporation’s founder created in Yiwu to
protect his designs and secure maximum labour eﬃciency may have been his own inno-
vation, but in his ethical orientation he seems to fashion himself more on a culturally-
complex and ideologically-secure model than a ‘new neoliberal’ of the sort discussed by
Yurchak (2003). In public discourse, ‘the Russian merchant’ has been oﬀered to Russian
entrepreneurs as an exemplar for collective identiﬁcation who does not have ‘oppositional
qualities’, even though this exemplar, like most post-Soviet sites of memory, is a subject of
moral controversy.
The ‘marginalised “losers”’ of the Russian Revolution’ (West 1998a, 3) as the historian
West called them, the Russian merchant estate were mainly known to the generations
of Soviet citizens from the works of the nineteenth century Russian classics who repro-
duced their negative image as a ‘dark imperium’ and ‘vulgarian tyrants’ (temnoe tsarstvo
and samodury).23 Contemporary historical research has variously engaged with these
stereotypes, pointing out that the merchant estate was a politically weak and unstable
social category prone to dubious professional ethics (e.g., West 1998a, 6–12; West
1998b) and undervalued by the Imperial state that favoured foreign entrepreneurs as
technologically superior. At the same time, the merchants, both Orthodox and Old
Believers, were known as adherents of ‘the old regime’, as traditionalists devoted to
the ideal of tsarist autocracy.24 An alliance with the Slavophiles, whom they supported
ﬁnancially, had nourished the estate’s anti-Western sentiments and general hostility
towards liberal ideas. Among the Moscow merchants, for instance, the verb ‘liberal’ni-
chat’ – ‘playing a liberal’ – was used to ridicule an opponent. Given their fervent patri-
otism (kvass patriotism) some historians argued that even those few wealthy and well-
travelled merchants who declared themselves Anglophiles were only superﬁcially cos-
mopolitan (e.g., Owen 1981).25 By the time of the socialist revolution in 1917, the mer-
chant estate was ideologically fragmented, and neither the political activism of its
members, nor their legendary philanthropy (their sponsorship of arts, education)
could help them to establish a publicly-recognised ‘heroic self’ (e.g., Clowes 1998)
due to their association with exploitation at the factory ﬂoor and rampant inequalities
(West 1998a, 11).
However unequivocal the images of the Russian merchant are in historical accounts, the
received myths of ‘stingy cheaters’ and ‘religious philanthropists’ (e.g., Bogachev 2012)
have been re-evaluated as a moral economy that could appeal to Russian sensibilities in
the Putin era. As one Russian scholar argued: ‘Against the background of the current pro-
blems of the [Russian] market economy, the [negative] image of the merchant most
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probably only irritates the ordinary Russian’ (Jakovleva 2008, 177). A diﬀerent ‘national
merchant’ (natsional’noe kupechestvo) – the ‘unjustly forgotten’ (Krasko 2010, 7) – have
now appeared in popular representations and cultural memory: ‘the origin of Russian
entrepreneurship’ (istoki rossiiskogo predprinimatel’stva) (Bogomolova 2012), ‘a pillar of
the Russian state’, ‘builders of Russia’ (stroiteli Rossii), agents of industrialisation, the key
contributors to the economic ﬂourishing of the Russian cities and so on. Newly opened
museums, exhibitions, monuments, countless publications, history programmes broadcast
on national and regional TV26 and digitally mediated re-productions have corrected Soviet
‘prejudices’ and commemorated the merchant estate.27
The post-Soviet discourse on the merchant estate is vast in breadth and diversity, and
its discussion lies outside the scope of this article. Suﬃce it to mention two interrelated
trends that stand out in this body of cultural production. One is a call to recognise that
‘Western and Russian commercial worlds were not simply diﬀerent planets, but rather
diﬀerent galaxies’ (Jakovleva 2007, 187). A clear-cut contrast is postulated between
Western attitudes to wealth as an individual achievement that beneﬁted only its proprie-
tor, and the Russian merchant – a bearer of the Russian spirit – who saw his wealth as a
source of public well-being (na obshchestvennoe blago),28 multiplying his capital for the
glory of Russia’.29 The other trend involves critical reﬂection on post-Soviet capitalism
via the prism of the ‘spirit of the merchant’ (dukh kupechestva). From this perspective,
post-Soviet ‘oligarchic’ Russian capitalism points to a rupture with tradition, for it does
not give much chance to many small traders and entrepreneurial muzhiks (‘real men’) to
come to the top. The wild capitalism of the 1990s has been replaced by state ‘governed’
capitalism under Putin, and with it comes a new rhetoric that postulates a ‘psychological
change’: a new understanding that the wealth of nation is not gas or oil, but the free and
socially responsible entrepreneur (sotsial’no otvestvennye predprinimateli) (fn. 28, Russkii
kupets’, 2012). Various online resources and teaching aids foreground the source of this
social responsibility in merchants’ collectivist values, harking back to the communes of
peasants (obshchina) and Old Believers.30
The re-evaluation of the Russian merchant as a model for a Russian capitalist moral
economy acknowledges the central role of the Orthodox Church and religiosity. The tra-
ditional national merchant was an Orthodox patriot. Since the early 1990s there are pro-
fessional organisations of businessmen/entrepreneurs with headquarters in Moscow,
St. Petersburg and other big Russian cities that work either under the aegis of the
Church, such as Clubs and Unions of Orthodox Entrepreneurs (pravoslavnye predprinima-
teli), or that cooperate with Orthodox Entrepreneurs, like The Society of Merchants and
Industrialists (Obshchestvo kuptsov i promyshlennikov) founded in Moscow. These organis-
ations have become mainstream and often have members of the ruling party, ‘United
Russia’, in key positions. Today they promote an alternative Ethical Concept of Entrepre-
neurship and alternative MBAs based on ‘the revival of traditional and development of
new values’, and ‘the best practice of pre-Revolutionary Russian entrepreneurs’.31 ‘For
the glory of the Fatherland’ (Vo slavu Otechestva) is a common slogan; ‘respect power’
(uvazhai vlast’) is a common message. Far from being a metropolitan development,
similar initiatives are commonplace at the grassroots in the Russian hinterland. For
instance, in 2000 a group of small traders in the town of Gagarin in the Smolensk
region established their own ‘Union of Entrepreneurs’ and advertised themselves as ‘suc-
cessors of the good traditions of the merchant estate’.32
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This tendency towards professional-political organisation of a non-oppositional charac-
ter among entrepreneurs and traders replicates the stereotype of the merchant estate as a
conservative supporter of the government. As Kordonskii (2008) pointed out, in general
terms, estate identiﬁcations in post-Soviet Russia are important in corporate competition
for state resources, allocations and rents that is often mistaken as simple ‘corruption’. At
present, from a legal point of view, in contrast to say (the titular estates of) the police
or the army, Russian entrepreneurs and traders are best seen as a ‘non-titular’ estate
that do not directly ‘serve’ the state (sluzhat). Kordonskii suggests that the formal establish-
ment of the merchant estate is on the way – the introduction of the Day of Entrepreneur
(Den’ Predprinimatelia) by the state is a step in this direction (Kordonskii 2008, 17). A simple
point I want to make here is that all these institutional arrangements of Russian civil
society and the state, and discourses that re-evaluate, rehabilitate and propagate ‘the
Russian merchant’ have also formulated values that shape a Russian capitalist moral
economy; ‘the merchant’ has become both a reﬂection and an expression of what it
also means to be a Russian-style neoliberal as well as an embodiment of a particular pol-
itical culture that competes with other ideological currents present in Russian society. The
creativity of the founder of the Corporation in Yiwu and the socio-economic form this Cor-
poration has taken are in part a product of the forces of global market competition and
Yiwu’s culture of (business) mistrust, but they have also been shaped by recently popu-
larised version of a merchant moral economy, which ties opportunities for commercial
expansion to the Russian state.
Conclusion
In this article I hope to have shown that from the moral economy perspective, the model of
a universal neoliberal trader with some Russian characteristics is not suﬃcient to grasp the
multiple sources of business creativity and the range of discursive practices available to
the Russian entrepreneurial class for the purpose of self-identiﬁcation. In present-day
Russia, a neoliberal trader can fashion himself with the help of the revived models from
former eras, like the patriotic, traditionalist, Orthodox merchant who lends his political
and economic support to autocratic power. Political and public attempts at recovering
the old Russian merchant as a positive social category underscore a worldwide political
strategy to align neoliberalism and traditional conservatism, however problematic such
an alliance can be (Crouch, della Porta, and Streeck 2016, 499). In Russia, the moral
economy of the merchant estate is called upon to mend historical ruptures between
diﬀerent moral frameworks of state socialism and capitalism as well as to complete tran-
sition from the West-oriented dispositions of the wild-1990s with its ‘bandits’ (banditskii)
and ‘oligarchic’ capitalism to state ‘governed’ capitalism of the Putin’s rule.
The case of the Corporation shows that global nodes of commerce like Yiwu and the
routes of ‘globalisation from below’ do not simply forge global neoliberal subjects out
of former Soviets. They provide new opportunities and contexts for ‘the Russian merchant’
to re-emerge in a novel format (albeit sometimes exhibiting the recognisable ‘vulgarian
tyranny’ (samodurstvo) of their pre-Soviet predecessors). The Corporation’s isolated
Russian compound in Yiwu has emerged in a climate of suspicion and informal opportu-
nistic economic behaviour in the market-place that small shuttle traders know only too
well. However, we can also speculate that it has taken this particular, idiosyncratic form,
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and become a nested moral economy I called ‘Russian-style Phalanstery’, because the
present-day ‘Russian merchant’ operates in a paranoid political environment where ideo-
logical language breeds uncertainty about actors’ actual commitments. Omnipresent
control and monitoring of social and intimate life provided by the Russian Phalanstery
model in Yiwu not only enhance labour productivity, but also address this uncertainty
and paranoia. The Russian old-timer in Yiwu, Nikolai, who was the ﬁrst to tell me about
the trader-founder of the Corporation, mentioned in passing that the founder refused
to give him a job in the company: ‘He said that he does not understand my way of think-
ing’. I wondered whether Nikolai understood the founder’s way of thinking and what all
this secrecy, segregation, mating, patriotic ritualisation and surveillance were about. He
was not sure he did but granted that all that was at the core of the matter: ‘It simply
works! He is a millionaire.’
Notes
1. The nature of these experiences (positive or negative) has itself become a highly politicised
and contested topic carried on in discussions on social media and online forums (e.g.
https://www.facebook.com/snarkf?lst=742145637%3A100001819035580%3A1492755374). It
often boils down to a more general question of how to evaluate the legacy of the 1990s
(the ﬁrst post-Soviet decade, the decade of ‘freedom’/ ‘chaos’). Under the current authoritarian
style of rule, the 1990s are represented by the regime’s supporters as a kind of dystopia
(Skvirskaja forthcoming).
2. Hence, the very concept of postsocialism retains its import long after the end of state socialism
in Russia (cf. Humphrey 2002b). There is, however, also a view that ‘postsocialism’ should only
be concomitant with the so-called period of transition (perekhodnyi period) from socialism to
capitalism and therefore, it is no longer a viable description of contemporary Russia (e.g.
Diatlov 2015).
3. In his address to the Federal Council in 2012 Putin famously used an archaism skrepy (an equiv-
alent of ‘linchpin’ in this context) to refer to Russian spiritual values that supposedly hold (or
should) hold Russians/Russian nation together.
4. Citizens of the Russian Empire were identiﬁed by estates (soslovia, e.g. noble, clergy, mer-
chant, peasant) which were ascriptive and often hereditary categories deﬁning the rights
and obligations of these groups to the state. As a legal-civic category the merchant
estate ceased to exist after the Russian socialist revolution in October 1917 (e.g. Fitzpatrick
1993). For an overview of the Russian merchant estate see e.g. West (1998a), and for a more
general overview of the Western and Russian scholarship on Russia’s merchants, see e.g.
Monahan (2016).
5. Statistics-based data on the background of Russian entrepreneurs (deﬁned as owners of a
business with a minimum of ﬁve employees) in the early 2000s indicates that there
were hardly any entrepreneurs among the grandparents of those surveyed. More than
40% had a parent or parents’ siblings involved in running a business (Djankov et al.
2005, 592).
6. See e.g. Krasko (2010) for an overview of St. Petersburg’s merchants’ family histories.
7. For a description of the diﬀerent Russian categories of traders participating in cross-border
trade, see e.g. Humphrey (2002a). The same categories in varying proportions are also
present in Yiwu.
8. This is a Russian pun on the Chinese abbreviation for Yiwu – CCC (China Commodity City). In
Russian, ‘CCC’ is rendered as ‘Selo Stremitel’nogo Samorazvitia’ (i.e. a ‘village of speedy self-
development’) (pingguo 2009).
9. Business consultants second this view when they argue (e.g. Rein 2012) that it is almost
impossible for foreigners to become a part of ‘true’ guanxi (connections, networks) unless
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they have lived in the country for a very long time and/or set up families with the locals,
gained school friends and so on.
10. This strategy is reminiscent of ‘individualist’ Genoese merchants (Greif 1994 in Tilly 2005, 9)
who paid the agent a high commission, ‘an eﬃciency wage’, to make the gain from cheating
a single time less interesting than the expected gain in the long term. Similarly, Russian traders
give higher rates to their Chinese agents in a bid to prevent them from taking commissions
from manufactures or increase suppliers’ prices during contract negotiations.
11. In Yiwu, I was told that Russians tend to avoid marriage and liaisons with the Chinese as a sign
of their cultural superiority. This attitude towards marriages with the Chinese is documented
elsewhere in China (e.g. Kireev 2016, 80).
12. This idiom was widely used by my informants-traders in the mid 2000s to explain the cheap-
ness of Chinese commodities.
13. Since the 2000s, the majority of long-term migrants from Russia have settled in major urban
centres in the most developed coastal part of China (Kireev 2016, 78). In Zhejiang province,
middle class Russians are concentrated in the province’s capital, Hangzhou, working mainly
in high-tech and electronic commerce (e.g. Alibaba).
14. http://malina.am/enciclopedia/simaland. Accessed 21 February 2017.
15. For a discussion of the ‘oﬀ-the-grid’ enclaves, see Ferguson (2005). While the Corporation in
Yiwu is integrated into the Chinese economy via its Chinese General Partner and hence,
does not resemble secured enclaves engaged in resource extraction in Africa described by Fer-
guson, it is imagined as if ‘oﬀ-the-grid’ by its Russian employees.
16. That is in the style of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, the main residence of the Russian
tsars.
17. https://ura.news/articles/1036264164. 27 February 2015.
18. Collective ﬁnes work by distributing the penalty for one employee’s mistake among all




22. See e.g. Shlosberg (2016). https://www.obozrevatel.com/politics/13942-lev-shlosberg-kazhdoe-
povyishenie-tsenyi-na-neft-uvelichivaet-shansyi-na-vozobnovlenie-vojnyi-na-donbasse.htm
23. These descriptions of the merchant estate were introduced by one of the most inﬂuential
Russian playwrights, Alexander Ostrovskii (1823–1886), who is credited with creating a
Russian national repertoire. Organised as a ‘non-tax’ estate along with the nobility, the mer-
chants (kupechestvo, kupecheskoe soslovie), whose social origins lay in the peasantry, serfs
and sectarian communities of Old Believers, did not enjoy the security of a hereditary
status. The estate was stratiﬁed into three guilds distinguished by wealth, which also
deﬁned the range and scope of members’ economic activities; membership in the estate
had to be renewed annually to secure commercial privileges (West 1998a).
24. This devotion seems to be common both among metropolitan and geographically remote
merchants. For instance, the memoirs of Siberian merchants in the late nineteenth century
testify that while critical attitudes towards central power were commonly voiced, the
monarch/tsar’s authority was never mentioned or discussed (see e.g. Matkhanova 2016).
25. Kvass is a traditional Russian beverage made from rye bread. The ironic term ‘kvass patriotism’
(kvasnoi patriotism) emerged in the nineteenth century to describe an uncritical form of patri-
otism incapable of negative evaluation of anything related to one’s patria. From an anthropo-
logical perspective, however, cosmopolitanism and patriotism should not be seen as per se
incompatible (cf. Appiah 1998 on patriotic cosmopolitanism). Also, the economic nationalism
of Russian merchants and industrialists during and after the World War I was not always a con-
servative force, but, at times, a radical anti-imperial disposition in favour of liberal nationalist
ideas of citizenship (Lohr 2003, 478–480).
26. Television series: ‘The hour of truth. Russian merchants. Traditions and mores.’ (Chas istiny.
Russkoe kupechestvo. Obychai i nravy). http://youtubesmotret.ru/watch/chas-istini---russkoe-
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kupechestvo---obichai-i-nravi---peredacha-tretya/rRI4Q3HSWVE, Chanell 365, Russian history
channel (Russkii istoricheskii kanal) (2008).
27. See e.g. http://www.ulzapovednik.ru/publikatsii/publikatsii/na-zashchite-kupechestva_2/;
Jakovleva (2017).
28. This statement was aired on the national TV channel Rossia, in the popular programme Kultura
(Culture) dedicated to ‘the Russian merchant’ in 2012. The invited experts were professional
historians from The Institute of Russian History under the Russian Academy of Science (RAN).
29. www.hnh.ru/handycraft/2011-02-05
30. http://gifakt.ru/archives/index/russkie-sovestyu-ne-torgovali-tradicii-russkogo-kupechestva/
31. http://opora-sozidanie.ru/?page_id=2see, Proceedings of the conference ‘Traditional values in
entrepreneurship’ (2016). E.g. the pan-Russian organisation of small and medium size entre-
preneurs ‘Opora Rossii’ (‘Pillar of Russia’, established in 2002, Moscow) set up a new project
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